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THE GLOBAL CULTURE OF COUNTERFEIT COMMERCE: RELATIONS OF 
PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Study of the consumption of counterfeit products casts 
consumers as reflexive agents who knowingly break the law 
(through the consumption of illegal commodities). Because 
this analysis is pitched at the level of meaning rather 
than structural constraints, it produces a misleading 
view of reflexive counterfeit consumption as being 
motivated by resistance or the wish to escape from 
normative coercion. 
This paper contrasts with approaches that prefigure 
meaning in explaining counterfeit commerce by treating 
the trade as an unavoidable structural feature of 
capitalism.  That is, the structural logic of capital 
accumulation inevitably creates a black market of 
counterfeit commerce. It is a parasitic form of illegal 
consumerism which mirrors conventional capitalist 
organization reproducing familiar dynamics of valued 
status differentiation. 
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Counterfeit commodities refer to products that violate 
registered copyright and patent provisions by illegally 
duplicating a brand. Counterfeit production entails the 
unauthorized use of a logo or trademark. The commercial 
relations organized around it typically involve the 
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exchange of illegal replicas at a lower price point than 
that of authentic branded products. Counterfeit goods are 
divided into two categories: (1) deceptive counterfeits 
i.e. fake products of knock-off’s that consumers believe 
to be authentic brands; and (2) non-deceptive 
counterfeits i.e. commodities that are recognized as 
inauthentic by specific information points such as 
quality, purchase location, price or materials used to 
make the product (Juggessur and Cohen 2009). The formal 
definition, set down in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), is as 
follows: 
 
 “Counterfeit trademark goods” shall mean 
 any goods, including packaging, bearing, 
 without authorization, a trademark that is 
 identical to that trademark validly registered 
 in respect of such goods that cannot be 
 distinguished in its essential aspects from 
 such a trademark, which thereby infringes the 
 rights of the owner of the trademark in question 
 under the law of the country of importation 
 (World Trade Organization 1994) 
 
Estimates of the extent of the global trade vary. Since 
disguise and dissimulation are the essence of exchange 
relations involving counterfeits the task of calculating 
the real size of the transactions involved is complex. 
Further, the entire enterprise of calculating volume 
accurately is open to challenge on methodological grounds 
(1). Notwithstanding this, a range of estimates has 
emerged which is broadly accepted in the field. At the 
lower end, the International Chamber of Commerce 
Intelligence Bureau (1997) puts counterfeit commerce at 
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5% of world trade. However, most critical commentators 
submit that this is a conservative estimate.  They hold 
that the trade accounts for between 5-7% of global trade 
(Kim and Karpia 2009: 79; Staake 2009; Lee and Workman 
2011: 289). At the upper level, Wiedmann et al (2012) 
contend that the portion of global trade given over to 
the exchange of counterfeits is in the order of 10% of 
global consumer transactions. The OECD (2008) estimates 
that the value of counterfeit products seized worldwide 
is $500 billion per year and maintains that this is only 
a fraction of what is in circulation (Kim and Karpova 
2010: 79).Whatever the true figure, there is little doubt 
that the trade constitutes a significant portion of the 
global economy and further, that its scale is rapidly 
expanding.  Norum and Cuno (2011: 27) calculate that over 
the last twenty years counterfeit commerce has multiplied 
10,000 times. When estimates of the undetected trade are 
added to recorded seizures of counterfeits by the 
authorities the trade is predicted to grow to $1.7 
trillion by 2015 (Guim. DiMase, Tehranipoor 2014). This 
is the result of a combination of factors, namely more 
efficient supply chains, better design values, 
deregulation of border controls, the spread of access to 
copyright design data through hacking, direct/low-risk 
internet sales provision, various forms of intellectual 
property theft, insufficient policing and escalating 
consumer demand. The most commonly counterfeited goods 
are luxury items: branded apparel, watches, jewelry, 
perfume, purses, sunglasses.  However, no product or 
brand is immune (Lee and Workman 2011). The trade extends 
to pharmaceuticals, automative and airline parts, 
electronics, sporting equipment, batteries, toys, hygiene 
products, alcohol, cigarettes and various forms of 
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intellectual property (Heinonen, Holt and Wilson 2012: 
354) (2).  
By definition, counterfeit commerce is unauthorized. It 
is therefore not subject to regulatory codes of practice.  
For this reason examples are seldom found in High Street 
or Shopping Mall settings. The main urban retail 
suppliers are street vendors, flea markets, car boot 
sales, liquidation sales and illicit shopfronts. However, 
in order to appreciate the increasing audacity and 
sophistication of the trade it is worth noting Yang’s 
(2014) report, that in 2011 an entire ‘fake’ Apple store 
with Apple merchandise was discovered in the southern 
Chinese city of Kunming. The store feature the trademark 
Apple spiral staircase with an inventory of knock-off 
Apple products and employees dressed in blue T-shirts 
with Apple nametags.    
Needless to say, the internet is a crucial, massively 
expanding point of sale. This reflects the switch in 
retailing from high street/shopping mall to online 
purchasing. Industry analysts submit that general 
internet usage multiplies globally at a rate of 20% per 
year (Wilson and Fenoff 2014:40). Some 60% of US 
consumers buy products online at least once per fiscal 
quarter (Anderson 2010). Online retail exchange provides 
a favourable climate for the growth of the commercial 
exchange of counterfeit products. In addition to the 
exchange of counterfeits, it is compatible with identity 
theft, credit card fraud, hacking and non-delivery of 
goods and services (Newman and Clarke 2003). E-commerce 
sites, like eBay, Craiglist and half.com, do not possess 
effective regulatory mechanisms to guarantee fidelity in 
product specification or advertising.  In addition, 
products advertised online are not available for physical 
inspection.  So customers fall back upon the reputation 
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of the seller and/or customer reviews (Gregg and Scott 
2006; Chua, Wareham and Robey 2007). Because of this, 
trade conditions are highly propitious to the conduct of 
fraud. The US Federal Trade Commission (2011) reported 
over 56,000 consumer complaints on internet auction fraud 
in 2010 alone.  Since it is probable that most customers 
do not make official complaints, or may not even be aware 
that a fraud has been perpetrated, this figure is very 
likely to be a serious under-estimate of the real 
magnitude of the problem.  
The increasing importance of the virtual environment in 
the exchange of illegal products means that the notion of 
counterfeit commerce needs to be extended to point of 
sale. With the rise of the digital economy, the internet 
is becoming fundamental to the global expansion of the 
trade. It is estimated that ‘cybersquatting’ (using a 
domain name that capitalizes on an established brand) 
accounts for 1.7 million web sites (Wotherspoon and Cheng 
2009: 32). The spread of the digital economy encourages 
the growth of counterfeiting.  It is a direct form of 
sale as retailers drive the business straight to consumer 
digital devices. For the most part, auction websites, 
such as e-Bay, are self-policed and hence attractive to 
counterfeit commerce. To be sure, e-Bay has been fined 
for omitting to efficiently counteract counterfeit 
trading (Treadwell 2012: 188). Additionally, servers can 
change identities rapidly and frequently.  This makes it 
challenging for the authorities to pinpoint digital 
supply chains and finance flows. Digital Piracy (DP) 
refers to the illegal reproduction of intellectual 
property and exchange by non-authorized vendors.  It is 
calculated that 35% of the packaged software installed on 
personal computers worldwide in 2005 was obtained by 
these means (Taylor, Ishida and Wallace 2009: 246).  
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Global movie piracy is estimated to result in a $6 
billion loss to the industry (Klein 2007). Similarly, the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
reports that 37% of all music CDs exchanged in 2005 was 
pirated and 20 billion songs were illegally downloaded 
(IFPI 2006). 
The articulation of the counterfeit trade in local 
settings disguises the organized, international 
dimensions of production and distribution.  While some 
portions of the trade are confined to local relations of 
production, distribution and exchange, Dick 
Hobbs (1998: 419) insists that the concept of ‘global 
network’ is the right perspective to apply. Organized 
crime works through local underworld points of exchange 
but interconnects with global supply chains. The thrust 
for illegal profiteering that produces counterfeiters in 
the first place, reproduces itself in the next place and 
is supplied by global sourcing and constitutes a global 
industry.  
The articulation of the network is influenced by multiple 
factors.  Among the most commonly cited are, demographic 
distribution, familial structures, ethnic distribution 
and cohesion, commercial practice, trading patterns and 
policing. Sourcing is concentrated among manufacturers in 
Far East Asia, principally China, South Korea, Taiwan and 
West Africa (Riston 2007). The post-Soviet bloc economies 
also contribute significantly to the trade. For example, 
industry reports on one of the most common types of 
counterfeiting, namely the production of cigarettes, 
indicate that 65% of volume is produced in China, and 20% 
in Russia (Nurton 2005). Chow’s (2003) research into the 
counterfeit trade in China unearthed deep links with 
organized crime and the collusion of local populations 
through protectionism. Following an escalation in 
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enforcement effects against illicit recreational drugs 
such as cocaine and heroin, there is evidence that 
organized crime syndicates such as the Russian mafia, 
Mexican drug gangs, Chinese Triads and Colombian drug 
cartels have switched resources to counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals (Mackey and Liang 2011). The involvement 
of organized gangs and  international cartels supports 
cross subsidization of criminal activities.  Revenues 
generated from counterfeit commerce are channelled into 
prostitution, human trafficking and terrorism (Vagg and 
Harris 1998).  
Factories are run on a ‘just in time’ principle so that 
counterfeiters can adapt rapidly to changes in markings, 
packaging and concomitant design features (McEwen and 
Strauss 2009: 253).  Counterfeit goods are transported to 
affluent metropolitan centres in the West through 
clandestine trade routes or online auction sites.  
At every level, the production, carriage and sale of 
goods is illegal. Producer’s copy luxury designs 
illegally, employ workers to produce facsimiles illegally 
and shield their activities from the eyes of the 
authorities, again illegally. Local distributors stock 
the products in camouflaged warehouses and supply 
consumers via underground pathways and bulk cargo trade 
routes that carry legitimate container material.  
        The size and vigour of counterfeit commerce 
raises several interpretive questions concerning 
authenticity, trust and meaning.  Walter Benjamin’s 
(2002) famous contribution to the sociology of culture on 
the consequences of mechanical reproduction, points to 
issues of originality, politics and status 
differentiation in the consumption of duplicates.  When 
the volume and scale of the global counterfeit trade 
nowadays is factored in, together with the subject of 
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consumer motivation, especially in the matter of 
consuming non-deceptive counterfeits, the issues multiply 
in range and complexity (3). Structurally speaking, the 
world of commodities exchanged under copyright and patent 
is mirrored by a counter-world consisting of illegal 
relations of production, distribution and exchange that 
are resistant to detection, policing and control. 
Counterfeit commerce certainly breaks the law.  However, 
when viewed from the logic of the general consumption 
process under capitalism it is also the rational 
extension of consumer activity into ‘hyper consumerism’ 
(Hayward 2004: 86) i.e. a form of subjective desire to 
accumulate goods and services that privileges the drive 
to consume above respect for contract in order to acquire 
price advantage or distinction (Hayward 2004: 86; Moxon 
2011).  
What does it mean to propose that counterfeit commerce is 
the extension of general consumerism into ‘hyper 
consumerism’? The capitalist mode of production assigns 
great weight to the consumption of goods and services as 
a mark of distinction (Bourdieu 1984). Counter cultures 
of consumption and anti-consumerist movements, in 
general, merely confirm this predominance since what they 
are reacting to, and ultimately reinforcing, is the 
normative assumption that equates status with sought 
after consumption. Hyper-consumption assigns status to 
unauthorized consumption and applies a variety of 
pretexts to support this interpretation. Thus, save in 
one respect, hyper-consumerism is faithful to the general 
status accumulation process of the authorized price 
mechanism. The proviso in question refers to the illegal 
basis of the relationships of production, distribution 
and exchange in counterfeit commerce.  By flagrantly 
flouting legal regulations it might be inferred that 
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counterfeit commerce renders morality forfeit. In 
reality, producers and consumers regard counterfeit 
status as providing no moral impediment to exchange. A 
different kind of consumer judgement about morality and 
authenticity appears to be operational here. Counter 
hierarchies of status, flexible moral judgements about 
production and consumption and global shadow networks of 
distinction, identity and difference built around the 
production, distribution and exchange of counterfeits 
have become normalized. Rutter and Bryce (2008:1158) 
submit that the purchase and consumption of counterfeit 
goods is a routine component of everyday life. It extends 
over all ages, ethnicities and is gender neutral. In 
emphasizing the ordinary quality of exchange, Rutter and 
Bryce (2008) problematize the commonsense twinning of 
counterfeit consumption with crime. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that non-deceptive counterfeits fulfil two 
sorts of consumer demand that are not satisfied by 
authorized production.  In the first place they supply 
the demand to acquire positive status differentiation 
through the accumulation of luxury goods and affordable 
prices.  Consecutively, they fulfil the need of some 
consumers to comment upon the vanity and waste of the 
luxury goods industry (Arellano 1994; Hilton, Choi and 
Chen 2004). Normalization suggests that the trade 
correlates with moral elasticity. That is, consumers 
refuse to designate trademark violation as regular crime.  
The elasticity in question relates to a variety of 
concrete issues of consumer motivation bearing upon, 
inter alia, issues of price advantage, value for money, 
one upmanship and the economic and cultural pretensions 
of the authorized trade particularly, in luxury goods. 
Before taking up these issues in greater detail, it is 
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necessary to remark briefly upon the main social 
interests adversely affected by the trade in fake goods. 
 
Who is Most Affected by Counterfeit Commerce? 
 
Wall and Large (2010: 1095) differentiate three sets of 
agents who are directly and indirectly affected by 
counterfeit commerce Copyright Holders, Consumers and the 
General Public. 
 
1) Copyright Holders 
 
The financial loss to copyright owners is 
impossible to calculate accurately. However, if 
the counterfeit trade really does account for 
10% of global commerce, revenue loss to 
aggregated businesses is at least one tenth of 
potential turnover. Given that counterfeit 
goods are priced significantly below the market 
rate, this figure is almost certainly a massive 
under-estimate. The counterfeit trade then, 
directly affects the profitability and economic 
growth prospects of legitimate business.  
Some sectors of the economy report a calamitous 
effect on authorized sales. Research into 
counterfeit electronic integrated circuits in 
2005-7 put the size of the counterfeit market 
in the region of 50% of total transactions; 
reports of counterfeits in the electronics 
business have quadrupled since 2009 (Guin, 
DiMase and Tehranipoor 2014: 10). The US 
Customs and Border Control reported in midyear 
2006 that 45% of seized counterfeit goods were 
fashion accessories; (Kim and Karpova 2010). 
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among the Top 5 brands counterfeited, 4 were 
fashion brands (Louis Vitton, Nike, Gucci and 
Prada), the fifth was Microsoft (Kim and 
Karpova 2010).  
The trade loss to European companies in the 
clothing and footwear sector is put at E1,266 
million; E555 million in the perfumes and 
cosmetics sector; E627 million in the toys and 
sports articles sector; and E292 million in the 
pharmaceuticals sector (Blakeney 2009: 7).  
Above and beyond the question of revenue loss, 
legitimate business faces a variety of other 
challenges with counterfeit trade.  
Counterfeits may damage the authorized brand 
and thus, diminish goodwill. The trade can 
increase the risk of being exposed to liability 
claims that arise from a flood of substandard 
products on the market carrying the brand name 
(Wilke, R. and Zaichkowsky, J. 1999; Staake, 
T., Thiesse, F.,and Fleisch, E. 2012). 
Moreover, in the long run, counterfeiting may 
act as a deterrent on the research and 
development dynamism of legitimate business.  
For what is the point of investing in R&D if 
the fruits of design are hijacked and 
duplicated by criminal interests? 
 
 2) Consumers 
 
Consumers may be divided into two groups: 
Vulnerable and Hoodwinked. Vulnerable consumers 
have a propensity to consume knock-off’s 
despite being cognizant that they are non-
deceptive counterfeits. 
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They are described as vulnerable for, despite 
being aware of the non-deceptive character of 
the counterfeit, they are at risk from 
purchasing goods that are not subject to 
independent regulatory standards. Generally, 
this motivation derives from pecuniary 
disadvantage in the marketplace.  For example, 
the purchase of counterfeit pharmaceuticals may 
be motivated by the desire to acquire some 
medical relief, however uncertain, in a market 
where the authorized product is beyond the 
financial means of the consumer. In addition, 
it may merely reflect the desire to acquire 
positive status differentiation.  There is 
evidence that some consumers with high 
disposable income will opt to purchase non-
deceptive counterfeits on value for money 
grounds (Pendergast, Cheun and Phau 2002; 
Gentry, Putrevu and Schulz 2006). In contrast, 
hoodwinked consumers are pure victims of fraud.  
That is, they are not cognizant that the 
commodities they purchased in good faith are 
illegally reproduced duplicates.  They are also 
subject to the risk of purchasing goods that 
are not subject to independent regulatory 
standards. 
The World Health Organization reports that 10% 
of global medication is counterfeit with an 
increase of 80% between 2000 and 2006. In 2001, 
Chinese authorities investigated 480,000 
incidents involving counterfeit drugs and 
attributed 192,000 deaths to counterfeit drug 
use (Chang 2009: 1516).The absence of 
independent regulation means that the 
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counterfeit pharmaceutical trade carries 
significant risks of morbidity and mortality. 
It is associated with spurious standards of 
resistance and toxicity. While all consumers 
are at risk equally, the hazard is concentrated 
in the lowest income quartile of Western 
society and in the developing world (Newton et 
al 2006: 602; Healy 2012) (4).  
Aldhous (2005) reports that research by the 
Cambodian Ministry of Health examined 230 
samples of 24 pharmaceuticals bought on the 
Cambodian market in 2000, including antibiotics 
and painkillers. They discovered that 3.5% of 
them consisted of less than 60% of the labelled 
quantity of active ingredient.  When the survey 
was repeated in 2003, 11% of samples fell into 
this category. In Haiti in 1990, 89 children 
died after taking fake cough medicine 
containing anti-freeze; in 1996, more than 
2,500 Nigerians reportedly died after receiving 
a fake meningitis vaccine (Kontink 2003: 46). 
Counterfeiting is especially prevalent in the 
spare parts sector of the transport industry, 
with obvious implications for public wellbeing. 
In the USA the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
estimates that counterfeiting deprives the auto 
parts industry of $3 billion and $12 billion 
globally (Mele 2004:16). The US Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) submit that 2%, 
or 520,000 of the 26 million airline parts 
installed each year are fakes (Wotherspoon and 
Cheng 2009: 32). The risks of illness and 
morbidity to consumers arising from 
unregulated, counterfeit trade need hardly be 
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laboured.  However, quantification of the true 
extent of damage done to vulnerable and 
hoodwinked consumers is problematized by the 
clandestine, global nature of the trade. 
Despite this, it is reasonable to assume that 
counterfeit commerce is a significant influence 
to global illness and morbidity rates. 
 
3)   General Public 
 
The distribution of counterfeit commerce in 
flea markets, uauthorized kiosk and liquidation 
sales, is often associated with festivity and 
the carnivalesque.  It is as if the consumer is 
getting one over on the over-priced catalogue 
and inventory of the luxury goods industry.  
However, responses of this type are myopic. 
Counterfeit commerce has major negative 
consequences for public finance. Since 
counterfeit commodities are exempt from fiscal 
discipline, significant production and sales 
tax revenue is lost to the Treasury. This 
carries over into threats to the authorized 
labour market. In the USA the counterfeit trade 
is held to be responsible for the loss of 
750,000 jobs per year; in New York alone, 
counterfeit sales are estimated to constitute 
£23 billion and involve a loss of $1 billion in 
tax revenue annually (Kim and Karpova 2010: 
79). In the sourcing countries undeclared 
production, false reporting compounds public 
revenue loss.  Hence, funds that could be used 
for various types of social investment for the 
benefit for the public are never generated. In 
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addition, as we have already noted, defective 
copies in the transport and pharmaceuticals 
trade may increase ill health and morbidity 
among consumers and so add to public health 
care costs. In so far as defective counterfeits 
are associated with risk, especially in the 
areas of transport components and 
pharmaceuticals, the trade in illegal 
commodities is a significant factor in the 
production and reproduction of risk society.  
 
The Endeavour of Policing and Consumer Motivations 
 
The coherence of organized global counterfeit commerce 
depends upon perpetual fluidity between the local and the 
global. Hence, tackling counterfeit commerce requires 
multi-level, international co-ordination between police, 
customs and national regulators of commerce. The growth 
of so-called ‘Trojan drugs’ has led to the pharmaceutical 
industry lobbying for radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags and 2-dimensional bar codes on pharmaceutical 
products to facilitate tracking (deKeiffer 2006: 325-7).  
However, the absence of fail safe tracking technologies 
and the lack of industry wide standards bedevil and 
frustrate the imposition of regulatory requirements 
(Kontink 2006: 142). Periodically, high profile policing 
interventions are implemented. For example, in 2010 the 
internet-based operation Pangea III, involving 45 
countries, cracked down on the counterfeit drug trade.  
An illicit drug cache valued at US$2.6 billion was 
recovered, 290 illegal websites were closed down and 76 
people were arrested (Siva 2010: 1725).  However, there 
are budgetary cost barriers in applying adequate 
policing. Similarly, enforcement measures fall foul of 
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global supply chains that are governed by disjointed 
jurisdiction. The USA has started talks with key trading 
partners to regularize international responses via the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). This seeks to 
strengthen information sharing between law enforcement 
agencies; increase criminal and civil enforcement of 
intellectual property rights violation; upgrade border 
controls; and reform the international law regarding the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (Sommers and 
Kilaru 2008). At the state level, authorities in host 
countries where supply is concentrated have taken 
measures to counteract the trade in a bid to enhance 
international standing. Russia and East Africa have also 
intensified enforcement against copyright violation (Von 
Braun and Munyi 2010; Charlton 2012).  However, at the 
level of the state, the opposition to counterfeiting has 
not all been plain sailing. The European Parliament 
refused to ratify ACTA in 2012 on the grounds that the 
proposed legislation threatens individual liberties by 
infringing personal privacy. The difficulties illustrate 
the problems confronting anti-counterfeiting law 
enforcers who struggle to combat crime, but face 
resistance from civil liberties groups who maintain that 
blanket legislation impedes individual rights to 
duplicate and exchange for private use. 
          In recent years, anti-counterfeiting 
legislation has intensified. In the USA, the Counterfeit 
Drug Prevention Act (CDPA, 2007) and the Intellectual 
Property Enhanced Criminal Enforcement Act (IPECEA, 2007) 
provide for harsher sentencing for trafficking in 
counterfeit goods and knowingly supplying counterfeit 
goods to ‘at-risk’ groups. In addition, the IPECEA 
criminalizes the intent to commit copyright infringement 
and assigns $12 million to create a special operations 
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unit, within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to 
coordinate the investigation of intellectual property 
crime.  However, given estimates of the scale of the 
trade which refer to ‘trillions’ of dollars of value in 
counterfeit circulation, these measures are a drop in the 
ocean. International statecraft has also stepped up anti-
counterfeiting provisions. However, it is widely agreed 
that obstacles to policing are formidable. Not the least 
challenge facing policing is that counterfeit commerce is 
normalized.  That is, the pattern of reactions to 
counterfeit products may rail against the trade in spare 
parts for aeroplanes and automobiles or pharmaceuticals, 
while encompass, as a standard operative in everyday life 
the consumption of counterfeit apparel, perfumes, 
software, leather goods and so on.  
Conventionally, exchange relations in democratic consumer 
culture are believed to be founded upon good faith and 
trust (Jacoby and Chestnut 1978; Rust and Oliver 1994; 
Alhabeeb 2007). Trust resides in the copyright or patent 
of the product and the legality of the exchange 
relationship. Important residual factors in building 
trust are packaging and the retail setting of exchange. 
Even internet purchases must be made through ‘recognized’ 
servers if they are to be valued as ‘legitimate’. The 
absence of trust is generally understood to render 
exchange relations forfeit.   
Counterfeit commerce overturns orthodoxy. In the case of 
non-deceptive counterfeits the transactions are 
automatically appreciated by consumers to be a trade in  
fakes. The culture of detected counterfeit commerce 
raises issues about the nature of the exchange 
relationship. What exactly, is being exchanged here? To 
answer this question a distinction can be introduced with 
respect to the question of consumer reflexivity.  
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Counterfeit commodity exchange involves a continuum of 
consumer reflexivity from the reflexive to the non-
reflexive purchaser. Reflexive consumers buy fake goods 
in the knowledge that they are counterfeit. Non-reflexive 
consumption (the hoodwinked consumer) take the purchase 
of counterfeit goods on trust i.e. as bona fide items. 
With respect to both groups, the main motivations behind 
the purchase of counterfeits is price advantage and 
perceived quality/value for money (Kim and Karpova 2010: 
80; Hendrianna, Mayasari and Gunadi 2103: 63). However, 
reflexivity is not confined to these economic indicators. 
Consumption is a social process that involves twin 
collateral considerations: namely, who is attributing 
authenticity to the good or service, the uses to which 
attribution will be put (Brunner 1994: 408).  These are 
partly political considerations.  In his classical 
contribution, Benjamin (2002) argues that reproduction 
deprives the work of art of its metaphysical aura (claim 
to uniqueness) and that production should carry positive 
political content. Since a large chunk of the counterfeit 
trade is based in luxury products, the logic of 
Benjamin’s argument can be transferred, without too much 
trouble, to the culture of counterfeit consumption. To be 
sure, the essence of the case that counterfeit 
consumption is merely the politicized extension of 
regular consumption practice into a state of hyper-
consumerism does just that (Hayward 2004: 86). To expand, 
the economic value of luxury items reflects the 
metaphysical aura that is culturally attributed to them. 
On this basis, the exchange of counterfeits operates to 
expose the ‘crass commercialism’ of the luxury goods 
trade (Moxon 2011; Naylor 2011). At the same time, it 
reveals the rigged nature of the system. On this logic, 
the consumer of counterfeits is held to seize advantage 
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of opportunities for consumption that the authorized 
system of consumption rations or debars. The exchange 
relationship is explicitly fused with questions of 
resistance and identity. Thus, it is assumed that 
consumers of fake goods are mostly concentrated in the 
ranks of the marginalized and excluded. The consumption 
of counterfeits is conflated with ‘risky’ transgressive 
practice. Through this means, consumers acquire the 
temporary, positive experience of control and fighting 
back in the teeth of a system that emiserates them 
(Winlow 2001; Hall, Winlow and Ancrum 2008; Bloch, Bush 
and Campbell 1993; Chaudry and Stumpf 2011). By 
implication, consumers who refrain from engaging in 
counterfeit consumption are seen as passive.  For by 
confining themselves to the track of conventional 
consumption they reinforce the unequal property relations 
upon which the system is founded. 
According to this tradition, the consumption of 
counterfeit goods is a strategic response to the general 
cultural struggle of acceptance and recognition in the 
context of societies founded upon class divided property 
relations (Presdee 2000; Hayward 2004). Pivotal to this 
line of analysis is the proposition that emotional, 
expressive qualities of counterfeit consumption are 
inextricable from questions of surplus and scarcity in 
political economy. Seizing symbols of luxury, status and 
power is analyzed as a social reaction to economic  
inequality and political marginalization.  Axiomatic to 
this is the proposition that the counterfeit trade 
thrives in the context of organized, historically rooted, 
structural inequality. At bottom, cultural criminology 
posits counterfeit consumption to be an illegal practice 
that arises from the social exclusion of agents from 
luxury acquisition and associated power hierarchies (by 
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reason of status and property qualifications).  Cultural 
criminology therefore equates consumer motivation with 
both challenging and reproducing the values of capital by 
dint of engaging voluntarily and reflexively in illegal 
activity (Ferrell et al 2004). The consumption of 
counterfeit commodities is explained either as an act of 
resistance against capitalist authenticity and power 
(embodied in copyright and patent law) (Young 1999; 
Presdee 2000). Or, it is presented as the inevitable 
mutation of consumer culture into ‘hyper consumerism’.   
 
The Politics of Moral Elasticity  
 
The case made by cultural criminologist’s rests upon 
cultural relativism dovetailed with moral elasticity.  
The location of underprivileged strata in a system of 
productive and asset accumulation based upon organized 
inequality is interpreted as the pretext for the 
reflexive consumption of counterfeits. Therefore, the 
counterfeit trade is regarded to be the underbelly of the 
capitalist mode of production. It is not a departure from 
capitalist logic and ordering, but a continuation of the 
same by other means. Practically, the comparatively low 
levels of resources allocated by the authorities to anti-
counterfeit policing suggests a considerable measure of 
acceptance that the trade is an inevitable product of the 
capitalist mode of production. Providers of authorized 
brands strive to buy labour and product components in the 
cheapest market in order to sell in the dearest. 
Suppliers of counterfeit goods pursue the same logic. In 
both cases the extraction of surplus value is the name of 
the game. It is just the legality of the actions, 
combined with the pricing mechanism in the respective 
production lines, that is different.  In points of both 
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production and consumption this logic complicates police 
counter measures. Certainly, commentators identify low 
risk of detection and inconsistent forms of punishment as 
magnets for the involvement of suppliers and consumers of 
counterfeits (Wall and Large 2010: 1097). 
Prima facie, this is an odd state of affairs. The 
counterfeit trade supports a global society of producers, 
distributors and consumers bound together by nothing less 
than transparent property theft. While it is universally 
acknowledged that the trade involves copyright/patent 
infringement, in general, the police apply a fairly soft 
policing policy. Doubtless, this reflects the grey status 
of counterfeit consumption in consumer culture. To some 
degree, especially in the area of internet supply and 
retailing, counterfeiters simply realize the latent 
potential contained in modern technologies of 
reproduction to increase access to commodities of various 
sorts.  
Although total hoodwinking of consumers is probably more 
significant than most people realize, in many cases, 
there is little doubt that consumers readily distinguish 
between legitimate brands and counterfeits (Vitell et al 
2001;King and Dennis 2006). That is, consumers are mostly 
reflexive and knowingly buy goods that violate copyright 
and patent. The trade is, in fact, organized around a 
peculiar double–standard. While those who engage in 
counterfeit commerce do not generally believe that they 
are committing a crime, they simultaneously believe that 
the sellers of these goods should be punished (Norum and 
Cuno 2011). In short, the counterfeit trade, is permeated 
with profound moral ambivalence. This is compounded by 
the nature of the ‘victim’ in counterfeit exchange. 
Research consistently finds that consumers are less 
willing to engage in counterfeit commerce when the victim 
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is an individual, as opposed to an abstract institution 
(corporation or state department) or society. The 
willingness of consumers to ‘get one over’ on 
corporations because they are perceived as abstract 
entities reinforces the argument of cultural 
criminologist’s that there is a political dimension in 
some forms of counterfeit exchange, especially 
transactions that bear upon the luxury goods trade.  
         There are obvious hazards in proposing that 
counterfeit exchange is pre-eminently a political act. 
Consistently research shows that price advantage and 
value for money are more imposing considerations in 
consumer behaviour (Kim and Karpova 2010; Hendrianna, 
Maysari and Gundai 2013).  Nonetheless, the trade 
continuously raises the political question, posed by 
Benjamin (2002), of the nature of the social interests 
that possess the power to authorize the ‘metaphysic’ of 
uniqueness in a work of art or delineate the market of 
luxury commodities. Consumption is not simply a matter of 
‘having’. It is also a matter of certification through 
social interpretation (Brunner 1994). This applies not 
just to the interpretation of the authenticity and value 
for money of the counterfeit, but, by implication, the 
pyramid of power that supports and validates  
authorization. The counterfeit pitches the supplier and 
consumer against hierarchies of power and chains of 
consumption from which consumers are excluded. In this 
sense, it is inextricable from political questions. In 
its own way, the effort of cultural criminology to break 
with ‘bloodless’ criminology is creditable. Yet in the 
process, the liberties taken cannot be permitted to pass 
without comment. To be sure, the production, distribution 
and exchange of counterfeit commodities has political 
implications for understanding the power hierarchy of 
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capitalist society.  But the case that counterfeit 
commerce is significantly ‘ironic’ or ‘resistant’ should 
not be pushed too far. While organized networks play a 
pivotal role in production, exchange and distribution, 
supply and consumption relations are often opportunistic 
and self contained. Cumulatively, buying a Louis Vuitton 
knock-off at a Saturday market may damage corporate 
market share, but it is hardly strong evidence of a 
meaningful challenge to the authorized price mechanism. 
As a social institution, counterfeit commerce is wholly  
parasitic upon the capitalist system of organization. 
There may be cases where counterfeiting is deliberately 
applied to erode or obliterate the market position of 
authorized producers in order to produce justice for 
consumers.  As such, they may be taken as evidence of a 
threat to the general price mechanism which is founded in 
the principle of maximizing surplus value.  However, such 
cases are very much in the minority. The bulk of the 
counterfeit trade is faithfully directed to supplying 
consumer demands for affordable prices and positive 
status differentiation. The positional judgements that 
consumers make in the counterfeit market may come with 
the frisson of risky business, but their net effect 
reproduces the price mechanism. Counterfeit commerce does 
not produce an alternative to the balance of surplus and 
scarcity in consumer relations. Luxury goods under 
copyright are still, on financial grounds, out of reach 
of the majority of consumers. Nor does the trade 
challenge the stigma of scarcity or the glamour of 
surplus. Only at the margins is the ironic consumption of 
counterfeit goods privileged over the certified value of 
commodities inscribed legally by copyright/patent.  
 
Conclusion: Counterfeiting and Law Enforcement 
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Currently, the law enforcement lobby is dominant in 
criminal legislation and police resourcing (Borzel 2006; 
Worrall 2010; Hobbs 2013). From the standpoint of 
cultural sociology, in the case of the counterfeit trade, 
the application of law enforcement policy will only 
produce pyrrhic victories. Transactions of production, 
distribution and exchange comfortably out-pace the 
management capacity of the police. The budgetary, manning 
and intelligence difficulties that national forces face 
in effecting co-ordinated international action are not 
replicated in the operation of the international supply 
networks that enable the circulation of counterfeits. 
Ramping-up law enforcement measures carry financial costs 
that governments and policing authorities are unprepared 
to pay.  Further, as the ‘get tough’ policies of the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) learned 
in the fight against illegal downloading of intellectual 
property, intensifying law enforcement provisions runs 
the danger of creating victims and turning public opinion 
against legislative and policing authorities (David 2010; 
Rojek 2011: 137-142). For each successful case that is 
brought against counterfeiters, score upon score of 
counterfeit transactions are never acted upon because 
they are never officially detected. As with illegal 
downloading, the flexibly, covert nature of the trade 
militates against effective law enforcement. Therefore, 
the proposition that policing resources are capable of 
stamping out counterfeit commerce simply does not carry 
water. 
Concentration of resources in advocacy and education to 
counter the trade by addressing the cultural aspects of 
relations of transaction in counterfeits is a more 
promising strategy. Global criminal supply networks are 
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bespoke aggregators. That is, they tailor their business 
operations by cross-subsidization. To put it concretely, 
the profits made from selling counterfeit handbags or 
perfumes are applied to underwrite operations in 
prostitution, human trafficking and terrorism.  Moving 
public awareness from regarding counterfeit commerce as 
mainly opportunistic, semi-carnivalesque forms of urban 
and online retailing, to acknowledging the links between 
organized counterfeit commerce and crimes against 
humanity may diminish the propensity to consume.   
Collaterally, raising public consciousness of the risks 
to health and mortality, especially in the trade around 
illegal pharmaceuticals and spare parts for airplanes and 
road vehicles, may have the same effect.  A variation 
here of note, is to focus advocacy and education 
programmes on comparatively cash-rich consumers of knock-
offs and highlight that the main consumer victims of the 
trade are located in the lower quartile income group of 
the economically advanced nations and the developing 
world.  
There is also purchase in exploring the development of 
encryption devices, such as RFID tagging and 2 
dimensional bar codes, to authenticate commodities 
bearing authorized brand names.  However, at present 
these devices are compatible with only some product 
lines, such as pharmaceuticals (deKeiffer 2006: 325-7). 
Furthermore, encryption technology is not full-proof. 
Decoding initiatives are a perpetual and a genuine threat 
to encryption integrity. The music industry provides an 
illuminating parallel. In 1998, the ‘Secure Digital Music 
Initiative’ (SDMI) was introduced in support of Digital 
Rights Management (DRM). The aim of SDMI was to produce 
infallible encryption protection technology to preserve 
copyright. In 2000 a watermark-based encryption system 
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was unveiled and hailed as an industry breakthrough. 
Hackers and cryptologists were invited to test the 
proposition by trying to break the code. Within three 
weeks, a team led by Ed Felten, a Professor of Computer 
Science at Princeton University, accomplished just that. 
Felten’s plan to publicize the neutralization of the 
watermark at a conference in Pittsburgh in 2001 was 
frustrated by a legal injunction issued by the RIAA and 
the Verance Corporation (a sound technology corporation). 
Since the watermark fiasco, the growth of the internet 
trade has produced more sophisticated encryption systems, 
such as Sony’s ‘Connect’ service for ATRAC-encoded 
digital music files, Microsoft’s WMA technology and Apple 
iTunes AAC-encoded system.  However, in view of the 
fecundity and unpredictable provisions of technological 
innovation it is futile to believe in a perfect, failsafe 
watermark system. The same applies to RFID and Bar Code 
encryption technologies. Despite this, more sophisticated 
encryption technologies provides another hurdle for 
counterfeiters and will act, pro tem, as an inhibitor of 
the trade. 
The parasitic nature of counterfeit commerce is the chief 
impediment to mitigating or erasing it. The key to 
understanding the dynamics of counterfeit commerce 
correctly lies in this. The imperative of capitalism is 
to extract surplus value in ever more inventive ways. It 
aims to accomplish this by dual, interrelated means. 
Firstly, driving down the costs of production in order to 
build a margin realized at point of exchange; and 
secondly, driving up hierarchies of positive status 
differentiation that make the propensity to consume so 
intoxicating as to be irresistible. Counterfeit commerce 
is the parasitic counter culture of this.  It deploys 
illegal means to accomplish precisely the same ends. When 
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all is said and done their market position derives from 
offering acceptable duplicates at affordable prices. The 
moral objections to the trade need to be tempered by a 
sociological understanding of the immense opportunities 
for extracting surplus value that are produced by the 
general pricing mechanism under capitalism. The 
unavoidable logic of capitalism is to produce 
opportunities for undercutting the legitimate market and 
fiddling. A vast, global inverse culture of consumption, 
that unapologetically robs Peter to pay Paul by 
audaciously violating fidelity to contract, constitutes 
the shadow land of the general price mechanism. Despite 
the admonitions and interventions of the law enforcement 
lobby, one is struck not by the precariousness of 
counterfeit commerce, but by its extraordinary tenacity. 
 
Reference 
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